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Abstract	
	
The	authors	of	the	"Conversational	Rollercoaster"	article	(Albert,	Albury,	Alexander,	Harris,	
Hofstetter,	Holmes	and	Stokoe	(date	20xx/this	issue)	give	a	vivid	and	engaging	account	of	a	
difficult	but	worthwhile	exercise:	bringing	live	Conversation	Analysis	to	the	public	in	a	
Science	Fair.	Part	of	their	motivation	is	a	claim	that	CA	is	uniquely	qualified	for	such	
exhibition:	as	a	mode	of	enquiry	it	has	what	they	call	a	"public	ethos".	I	examine	that	part	of	
their	case,	and	suggest	that	it	might	not	be	as	waterproof	as	it	appears.	But	such	qualms	
ought	not	detract	from	the	positive	benefits	of	sharing	CA's	attractions	with	the	public.	The	
manifest	success	of	the	event,	and	its	grounding	in	solid	CA	practice,	is	enough	reason	to	
hope	that	others	will	be	inspired	to	follow	in	these	pioneers'	footsteps.	
	
	
	
	
	
Psychologists	sometimes	tell	each	other	the	story	of	how,	in	1884,	Francis	Galton	not	only	
got	thousands	of	people	to	do	his	battery	of	psychophysical	tests,	but	to	pay	him	
threepence	each	for	the	privilege.	If	only,	psychologists	will	say,	we	could	set	up	a	booth	in	
an	exhibition	hall,	as	Galton	did,	and	get	the	public	to	pay	to	do	our	experiments	on	them!	
Well,	perhaps.	We	can	skate	over	Galton's	unpalatable	eugenic	motivation	for	his	data-
mining1,	and	celebrate	instead	the	happier	idea	of	getting	the	social	sciences	out	there	in	
the	world	to	be	seen,	appreciated	and	contributed	to	by	ordinary	people.		
	
That	was	the	admirable	motivation	behind	the	"Rollercoaster"	project	described	in	Albert,	
Albury,	Alexander,	Harris,	Hofstetter,	Holmes	and	Stokoe's	article	(date	20xx/this	issue).	
They	set	up	a	stall	in	an	exhibition	hall,	and	offered	passers-by	the	chance	for	their	
interactions	to	be	studied	-	in	their	case,	videoed	and	subjected	to	close	analysis	-	and	they	
even	got	to	the	public	try	some	analysis	themselves.	It	was	a	brave	enterprise-	and	it	seems	
to	have	been	a	resounding	success2.	What	can	we	learn	from	it?	
	
1.	The	rationale		
                                                
1	He	wanted	to	show	that	parents	passed	on	the	intelligence	to	their	children	-	support,	in	his	eyes,	for	
selective	breeding;	but	went	away	disappointed	at	finding	no	correlation	(Colman,	1987/1993	p	18).	
2	Disclosure:	I	was	on	the	fringes	of	the	early	preparation	for	the	event,	and	took	a	minor	part	in	the	
proceedings	on	the	first	day.	
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Albert	et	al	-	I'll	refer	to	them	from	now	as	'the	authors'	so	as	to	spread	the	credit	fairly	-	
might	have	mounted	the	event	just	as	a	celebration	of	interactional	studies	in	general,	and	
Conversation	Analysis	in	particular.	As	a	celebration	they'd	have	been	following	not	so	much	
in	Galton's	footsteps	(who	wanted	the	data	for	his	own	dark	purposes)	but	those	of	the	
more	humane	and	forbearing	figure	of	Frederic	Bartlett,	who,	in	May	1913	"for	several	
hours,	sat	in	a	darkened	room	exposing	geometrical	forms,	pictures	and	a	variety	of	optical	
illusions	to	the	brief	examination	of	a	long	string	of	visitors"	(1932/1977	p.	v).	Bartlett	was	
proudly	showing	off	Cambridge's	new	Laboratory	of	Experimental	Psychology,	and	the	
authors	here	want	to	show	off	CA,	with	the	same	hope:	that	it	stimulate	the	public,	and	
promote	the	idea	that	science	could	be	accessible	as	well	as	profound.	
	
This	new	event	would	set	up	a	stall	at	the	huge	2016	New	Scientist	exhibition	in	London,	
and	demonstrate	CA	just	as	neighbouring	stalls	would		demonstrate	such	wonders	as	
virtual-reality	kits,	or	computerised	clothing.	The	experience	would	be	appreciated	and	
enjoyed,	with	the	science	as	a	moral	warrant	for	all	the	fun.	But	-	because	this	was	all	
happening	in	a	Science	Exhibition	-	the	person	at	the	stall	would	be	conscious	that	their	
vivid,	particular	and	personal	experience	was	a	scientific	one,	and	would	go	away	more	
informed	about,	and	better	disposed	to,	that	specific	kind	of	science	that	they'd	had	their	
hands	on,	and	science	in	general.	If	CA	could	be	plugged	into	that	scheme,	it	would	fulfil	the	
authors'	ambition	to	find	"new	ways	to	engage	partners	in	dialogue	both	within	and	beyond	
academia	to	promote	greater	awareness	of	rigorous	empirical	research	into	human	
interaction"	(Albert	et	al,	date	20xx/this	issue,	p	xxx).	
	
Probably	most	students	of	CA	would	support	that	sort	of	campaign,	without	further	cause.	
But	the	authors	have	a	still	more	ambitious	story	to	tell.	For	them,	there	is	something	
special	about	CA	that	gives	its	public	demonstration	a	particular	weight.	CA,	according	to	
this	view,	is	undervalued:	not	only	is	it	about	the	public	world	of	talk	(or	interaction	more	
generally)	but,	as	a	mode	of	enquiry	it	is	a	"public	science",	and	has	what	they	call	a	"public	
ethos",	and	that	makes	its	exposure	to	the	world	all	the	more	urgent.	Moreover,	they	hold	
that	getting	members	of	the	public	to	comment	on	what	they	see	on	video	can	reveal	things	
which	might	be	"viable	for	use	in	future	research,	and	that	they	therefore	constitute	
practical,	endogenous	evidence	of	‘impact’".	What	do	they	mean	by	these	claims,	and	are	
they	true?	And	need	they	be,	to	get	CA	out	there	in	such	things	as	a	science	exhibition?	
	
2.	Conversation	Analysis	as	a	"public	science"	
	
The	authors	set	out	three	kinds	of	evidence	for	their	claim	that	CA	is	a	"public	science":	talk	
is	inherently	public;	CA	practice	is	to	show	and	share	the	raw	data	on	which	it	works;	and	CA	
can	say	something	about	troublesome	public	worries	like	sexuality,	class	and	gender.	
Readers	of	this	journal	will	be	happy	enough	with	the	first	proposition,	that	talk	is	public;	
but	there	is	reason	to	be	cautious	about	the	nature	of	the	'public'	in	the	latter	two	claims.	
	
In	the	case	of	data,	certainly	it	is	part	of	CA's	manifesto	that	the	analysts	make	their	data	
available,	to	show	their	working.	But	there	are	familiar	grounds	to	worry	about	quite	what	
transformation	data	suffers	when	CA	researchers	make	it	public,	in	the	transcriptions	that	
appear	in	publications	and	even	in	raw	form	as	viewed	or	heard	in	data	sessions.	The	
authors	soft-pedal	the	problems,	but,	as	they	and	other	students	of	CA	know,	the	concerns	
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start	right	back	at	the	beginning.	Gail	Jefferson	herself	issued	caveats	about	her	own	
transcription,	taken	up	and	expanded	by	Ochs'	(1979)	first	statement	of	the	transcription-
as-theory	problem.	Matters	got	more	complicated	with	the	rise	of	affordable	video	cameras	
(Goodwin,	1993,	was	an	early	guide	to	the	complexities	of	filming	for	interactional	
research),	prefiguring	the	current	debate	over	what	gets	presented	as	data	(Ayaß,	2015)	or	
indeed	recorded	as	'data'	in	the	first	place,	in	terms	of	the	selection	of	date,	time,	place,	
camera	position,	camera	angle,	the	duration	of	the	shot,	its	composition	and	so	on	(see,	for	
discussions	Heath	et	al,	2010,	and	Broth	et	al,	2014).		
	
So	although	it		is	certainly	part	of	CA	doctrine	that	data	is	made	public,	the	claim	has	to	be	
hedged	about	with	qualifications	about	quite	what	one	should	make	of	any	given	example,	
since	by	necessity	even	the	careful	reader	of	articles	will	not	be	aware	of	all	the	
contingencies	that	landed	this	particular	snippet	in	front	of	them.	Seasoned	CA	readers	
know	that	they're	not	usually	told	all	that	much	about	the	ethnographic	circumstances	of	
the	data-collection,	let	alone,	in	the	case	of	on-the-hoof	video,	the	recorder's	moment-by-
moment	decisions	about	framing,	duration	and	so	on.		So	yes,	CA's	data	is	'public'	in	the	
sense	that	(some	of)	it	is	shared,	but	only	after	a	complicated	and	not	always	conscious	
series	of	choices	in	how	it	got	recorded	in	the	first	place,	and	another	equally	veiled	and	
perhaps	ad-hoc	series	of	choices	in	how	it's	presented	once	it's	clipped	out	of	the	analyst's	
audio-	or	video	file.	So	that	leg	of	the	table	is	a	bit	shaky.	I	should	quickly	say	that	none	of	
this	invalidates	the	Rollercoaster	authors'	account	of	the	analysis	of	what's	in	front	of	the	
reader.	That	lives	or	dies	by	virtue	of	the	skill	of	the	analyst	in	deploying	now	well-
established	CA	apparatus.		It's	the	Rollercoaster	authors'	'public-ness'	of	CA	data	that	
perhaps	oughtn't	be	relied	on	quite	at	face	value,	if	one	is	thinking	of	a	general	principle.	As	
it	happens,	their	own	practice	at	the	science	fair	was	much	more	transparent	-	the	observer	
could	see	more	or	less	exactly	where	the	data	came	from	(a	round-table	discussion	right	in	
front	of	them),	and	would	be	able	to	make	a	fair	judgement	about	whether	any	snatch	of	it	
was	a	fair	one.	But	the	authors	would	be	making	something	of	a	leap	to	imply	that	this	was	
how	CA	dissemination	usually	worked.	
	
As	for	CA's	commitment	to	the	public	world,	there	is	a	definite	queasiness	among	some	
commentators,	outside	CA,	about	its	claims	to	say	anything	about	what's	really	publicly	
important	-	see,	to	pick	examples	over	time,	CA's	treatment	at	the	hands	of	the	critical	
discourse	analysts	Fairclough	(1992)	or	Parker	(2005).	Students	of	CA	and	readers	of	this	
journal	may	be	more	familiar	with	the	uncomfortable	exchange	in	these	pages	between	
Schegloff	(1997,	1998,	1999)	Wetherell	(1998),	and	Billig	(1999)	which	laid	bare	one	
principal	bone	of	contention	-	that,	without	context,	no	interaction	is	fully	intelligible;	and	
that	context	must	(allegedly)	include	the	not-necessarily-visible	political,	ideological	and	
cultural	forces	that	are	sending	down	waves	of	influence	from	far	overhead.	The	
Rollercoaster	authors	are	of	course	perfectly	aware	of	the	quarrel,		but	they	put	their	
money	on	the	side	that	claims	that,	if	something	is	operative,	then	it	will	show	up	on	the	
ground,	in	the	details	of	the	interaction.	So	studies	which	show	that	people	orient	-	in	their	
recordable	talk	-	to	sociological	categories	like	sexuality,	class	or	race	are	evidence	that	CA	is	
indeed	about	the	public	sphere.	(They	might	also	have	mentioned	the	small	but	growing	
number	of	CA	studies	which	use	distributional	statistics,	in	traditional	social-science	ways,	to	
map	conversational	practices	onto	sociological	categories,	even	if	the	participants	in	the	
scene	never	openly	advert	to	those	categories	(for	example,	Stivers	and	Majid	on	doctors'	
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questioning	of	children	of	various	races,	2007).	This	isn't	the	place	to	arbitrate	on	such	a	
large	question,	but	I	think	it's	probably	fair	to	say	that	someone	coming	from	outside	CA	
would	be	unimpressed	with	its	claims	to	simply	letting	the	data	speak	sociologically	and	
politically	for	itself.	
	
So	two	of	the	legs	of	the	authors'	arguments	might	not	be	quite	as	sturdy	as	they	would	like,	
at	least	were	they	to	be	tested	by	someone	who	had	heavy	qualms	about	the	idea	of	public	
(in	the	sense	of	un-mediated)	'data'	and	public	(in	the	sense	of	fully	accountable)		'context'.	
For	those	already	in	the	CA	camp,	I	imagine	that	such	worries	would	be	part	of	a	general	
intellectual	wrangle	that	they're	long	used	to	coping	with,	and	won't	be	too	much	of	a	
hindrance	to	the	public-science	project	that	the	Rollercoaster	so	enthusiastically	embodies.	
	
3.	Impact	
	
Impact	is	the	Rollercoaster	project's	strongest	suit,	whatever	the	reader's	intellectual	
commitments.	The	authors'	account	gives	a	lively	sense	of	the	at	times	hectic,	complex	
interplay	of	desk-based	analysts,	camera	operators,	peripatetic	explainers,	and	talk-show	
round-table	conversationalists	at	the	heart	of	it.	The	video	that	the	authors	made	of	the	
event	(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HukdRTnl228&t=187s>)	captures	the	bustle.	
At	the	heart	of	it	is,	as	the	authors	are	at	pains	to	point	out,	some	real,	real-time	CA;	they	
could	have	faked	it	by	bringing	along	some	more	or	less	predictable	already-known	
examples	of	the	kind	of	thing	that	happens	in	conversation,	but,	as	they	say,	that	would	
badly	diminish	the	authenticity	of	the	spectacle.	Theirs	was	a	high-risk	act,	in	which	analysts	
worked	quickly	(but	honourably)	on	the	data	that	streamed	in	live	from	the	camera,	they	
spotted	something	that	looked	like	a	practice,	and	worked	it	up	and	handed	it	to	the	
explainers,	who	fed	it	back	out	to	the	people	who	had	seen	in	in	real	time.	That's	a	lot	of	
plates	to	keep	spinning.	
	
The	pleasing	thing	is	that	it	worked,	certainly	as	a	spectacle,	and	well	enough	for	authors	to	
report	that	some	members	of	the	passing	public	"got	it"	in	the	way	that	one	sometimes	sees	
university	students,	fresh	to	CA,	get	it	on	first	exposure.	And	members	of	the	public	are	a	
much	tougher	audience.	To	be	sure,	they	were	enjoying	a	performance	that	we	never	
trouble	to	present	to	our	students;	those	get	the	dry	biscuit	of	a	transcript	and,	if	they're	
lucky,	a	carefully	neutralised	bit	of	rather	dull	video.	So	here	is	an	engaging	picture	of	clever	
people	doing	technical	computer	work	on	images	taken	from	the	scene	in	front	of	them,	
and	making	it	their	business	to	reach	out	and	seduce	them	into	understanding	things	in	that	
scene	that	they'd	not	quite	noticed	before.	In	their	article,	the	authors	smartly	recruit	the	
voices	of	two	young	people	who	got	caught	up	in	that	cycle,	got	enthused	by	what	they	saw,	
immersed	themselves	in	it,	and	came	up	with	their	own	analytical	take	on	the	data.	That's	
the	gold	achievement		that	the	authors	were	trying	for:	indigenous,	but	sophisticated,	public	
analysis.	Quite	a	coup.	
	
"Impact"	is	now	a	cultural	trope	in	the	world	of	UK	higher	education	(and	no	doubt	
elsewhere	too,	under	that	name	or	some	other).		Academics	have	to	demonstrate	that	we	
make	a	difference.	The	big-ticket	differences	are	in	places	where	there	is	some	measurable	
social	good,	usually	indexed	by	money.	But	outreach	of	this	kind	counts	as	well,	to	
administrators	as	well	as	to	we	ourselves,	who	want	our	science	to	get	an	airing	and	to	be	
 5 
valued.	Mounting	an	active,	engaging	show,	drawing	in	many	hundreds	of	people,	is	a	
terrific	example	of	how	to	make	an	impact	without	compromising	the	central	virtues	of	the	
science	and	scholarship	that	you're	trying	to	promote.		
	
4.	Conclusion	
	
Outside	of	the	CA	community,	and	perhaps	among	some	inside	it,	not	everyone	will	be	
wholly	confident	about	the	authors'		'public	ethos'	platform,	or	at	least	the	reliability	of	its	
'public	data'	and	'public	commitment'	planks.	But	the	authors'	enterprise	-	with	so	much	
more	of	an	attractive	motivation	than	Galton's,	and	promising	more	excitement	than	
Bartlett’s3	-	will	surely	appeal	anyway.	There	is	a	buzz	in	making	language-in-interaction	
work	as	a	science,	in	real	time,	in	front	of	a	large	audience	who	are	ready	to	appreciate	it	
and	even	to	muck	in	and	have	a	go	themselves.	The	authors'	pioneering	efforts	ought	to	
inspire	many	CA	people	to	try	something	similar,	though	it's	true	that	the	set-up	is	
complicated,	and	wants	funding,	planning,	and	co-ordination	among	technicians,	analysts	
and	people	willing	to	put	on	an	extroverted	show.	That	doesn't	come	cheap	in	money	or	
time.	But	the	success	of	the	Rollercoaster	shows	that	it	merits	the	investment,	and	should	
encourage	other	academics	to	try	their	own	version	of	it,	away	from	academia	and	out	in	
the	public	world.	
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